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We examine the role of spatial proximity for Venture Capital (VC) investments in 
Germany. The main database is a survey of 85 personal interviews with 
representatives of different types of financial institutions. The analysis shows that 
spatial proximity is far less important for VC investments than is often believed. 
For example, the results indicate that syndication is partly used as an alternative to 
spatial proximity. Telecommunication does not work as a substitute for face-to-
face contact. On the whole, regional proximity is not a dominant factor in VC 
partnerships. Therefore, the absence of VC firms in a region does not appear to 
cause a severe regional equity gap. 
JEL-classification:  G24, O16, D21, M13, R12  




“Ist für Venture Capital Investitionen tatsächlich räumliche Nähe 
notwendig? Eine empirische Untersuchung“ 
Wir analysieren die Rolle räumlicher Nähe für Venture Capital (VC) Investitionen 
in Deutschland. Die Datengrundlage bildet eine persönliche Befragung von 85 
Investmentmanagern unterschiedlicher Typen von Finanziers. Die Analyse zeigt, 
dass räumliche Nähe für VC Investitionen wesentlich weniger bedeutend ist, als 
weithin angenommen. So finden sich beispielsweise Hinweise, dass die 
Syndizierung von Investitionen zumindest teilweise als Alternative zu räumlicher 
Nähe genutzt wird. Telekommunikation fungiert nicht als Substitut für 
persönliche Kontakte. Insgesamt wird deutlich, dass regionale Nähe kein 
bedeutender Faktor für VC Investitionen ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das 
Fehlen eines VC Investors in einer Region noch lange keine Grund für eine 
regionale Unterversorgung an Risikokapital darstellt. 
JEL-Klassifikation:  G24, O16, D21, M13, R12 





1.  Introduction 
It is largely undisputed that spatial proximity of Venture Capital (VC) firms and 
the location of their investments should be important. The assumption underlying 
this conjecture is that spatial proximity may in many cases constitute a 
precondition for the formation of a VC relationship and that it makes supervision 
of investments easier. This hypothesis implies that innovative firms in regions 
with no VC investment companies nearby may experience a serious disadvantage 
due to an “equity gap”, i.e. poor availability of capital, and that this capital 
shortage could severely hamper their emergence and development. But does this 
supposition that spatial proximity plays such a decisive role really hold? Based on 
an inquiry of VC suppliers in Germany, we cast serious doubt on the importance 
of spatial proximity in VC partnerships, especially in comparison to other types of 
financiers. We will show that geographic distance does matter, but its role is 
largely overestimated in the literature. Furthermore, we find evidence that 
regional proximity is less important for VC companies in comparison to other 
types of suppliers of smart capital, such as banks or Business Angels. 
Based on a short review of the literature about the importance of spatial 
proximity for VC investment (section 2), we investigate the spatial distribution of 
VC firms and their investments in Germany (section 3). Section 4 then provides 
an overview on the characteristics of the different types of financial institutions 
offering smart capital in our sample of interviewed firms and the spatial proximity 
of their investments. We then analyze the role of the two means that may be used 
for overcoming problems of spatial distance between VC suppliers and their 
investment, telecommunication, and syndication (section 5). Finally, we discuss 
reasons for the relatively low importance of regional proximity for VC 
investments in Germany (section 6) and draw conclusions for a policy as well as 






2.  Why should spatial proximity be important? 
The dominant goal of VC investments is to add value to the financed company 
and to sell the investment share with considerable profit. The VC companies’ 
main tasks are the identification of promising investment opportunities and a 
strong post-investment involvement; i.e., monitoring and supervising the 
companies in their portfolio. Several studies suggest that identification of 
promising investment opportunities and involvement in business affairs of the 
portfolio firms may require intensive communication combined with frequent 
face-to-face contact and that such a close relationship cannot be maintained over 
larger distances.
1  
There are a number of arguments for the importance of spatial proximity in 
VC investments. First, regional proximity may be necessary in order to gain 
knowledge about companies that could be a promising investment (Green, 1991, 
23; Doran and Bannock, 2000). Since such knowledge may be tacit and mainly be 
communicated by personal contact, it can be largely limited to the local business 
community (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Powell et al., 2002; Thompson, 1989). 
Spatial proximity may also be conducive for making a final investment decision 
which will in most cases require close face-to-face and on-site inspection of the 
project (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). Second, proximity may be needed for an 
appropriate exchange of knowledge with the portfolio company and a high level 
of monitoring by the VC firm (Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995). A regular exchange 
of information may be an important factor for the success of the portfolio 
company and, therefore, of the investment (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001; De Clercq 
and Sapienza, 2006). Empirical research has shown that this information flow is in 
both directions, i.e., from the firm to the VC company as well as from the investor 
to the portfolio firm (Schäfer and Schilder, 2006; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; 
Sapienza et al., 1996). It is commonly assumed that the costs of monitoring and 
supervision will sharply increase as the distance between the partners increases 
                                                 
1  Fried and Hisrich (1995), Gompers (1995), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2004), Lerner (1995), Macmillan et al. (1988), Sahlman (1990), Sapienza (1992), Sapienza et al. 




(Mason and Harrison, 2002a; Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). If a portfolio firm is not 
located within the distance of a day trip, personal contacts will probably require 
much higher transaction costs and, therefore, be less frequent than if the 
investment would be close to the site of the investor. As contacts via 
telecommunication can be regarded as a partial substitute for face-to-face 
contacts, one may expect a negative relationship between regional proximity and 
the frequency of telecommunication. Accordingly, the number of personal face-
to-face contacts should be higher if investments are located nearby (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002). 
There are good reasons to assume that the need for monitoring and 
consulting and, therefore, the importance of spatial proximity depends to a 
considerable degree on the development stage of the financed firm. A young 
company in the early phase of its technical and organizational development, 
which still does not generate considerable turnaround or profit, is likely to require 
more involvement by the VC firm than a company at a later stage (Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992). This may particularly hold for innovative businesses which are 
still in the phase of developing their product. Possible reasons are a lack of 
business and management skills in young innovative companies which are in most 
cases run by engineers or natural scientists (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992) as well as 
a high uncertainty of the technical and economic success of the project (Sapienza 
et al., 1996). Therefore, monitoring and supervision of investments in earlier 
stages may be more time-consuming and cause higher transaction costs than in the 
case of an investment in a later stage. Hence, spatial proximity can be expected to 
be more important for early stage investments (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). 
Accordingly, a VC supplier with a high share of early stage investments in its 
portfolio should have pronounced preferences for investments being located 
nearby (Elango et al., 1995). 
A further factor that is said to influence the distance between the VC 
supplier and the portfolio firm is the size of the VC company. The larger the VC 
firm in terms of the number of investments or the number of managers, the more 
likely it is that investments are made in more distant locations (Gupta and 




capitalist with voluminous available funds is perhaps faced with only rather 
limited investment opportunities in his region and, therefore, has to explore 
investment opportunities in more distant locations in order to utilize the available 
resources. Another reason why VC suppliers with larger funds may have more 
investments at distant locations is that they have greater and, perhaps, also better 
resources for monitoring and consulting. Presence of large amounts of resources 
also raise the probability for having a closely tied communication network 
available which facilitates access to a greater number of investment opportunities 
and to more syndication partners (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). Syndication here 
means that the investment involves several investors which allows for sharing the 
volume of investment as well as the risk and the work involved (Lerner, 1994; 
Brander et al., 2002; Lockett and Wright, 2001; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; 
Doran and Bannock, 2000). It can constitute an important strategy of VC suppliers 
to reduce the disadvantages of spatial distance to a portfolio company (Florida and 
Kenney, 1988; Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). In the case of a syndicated investment, 
the so-called lead-investor undertakes the main task of monitoring and consulting 
whereas the co-investors are involved with the business of the financed firm to a 
considerably lesser degree (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). For these co-investors, 
regional proximity is not as important as for the lead-investor because of the 
lower need of direct face-to-face contact with the portfolio company (Wright and 
Lockett, 2003). Therefore, joining a syndicate as a co-investor may be a measure 
of overcoming possible problems attached to spatial distance to the portfolio firm. 
If VC firms are publicly funded or in public ownership they may face 
governmental restrictions with regard to the location of their investments (Doram 
and Bannock, 2000; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). Quite frequently, publicly owned 
VC suppliers are destined for providing capital in a specific region and are, 
therefore, not allowed to make investments outside this region or abroad (Doran 
and Bannock, 2000). Furthermore, the scope of investments of VC companies in 
public ownership may be concentrated on projects in later development stages. 





2 or silent partnerships (Schilder, 2006). The two latter forms of financing 
instruments are located between the two poles of equity and debt in balance-sheet 
terms. They usually do not include voting rights and do, in most cases, involve 
less risk than equity financing. A focus of public VC companies on these products 
may be grounded in a higher degree of risk aversion. Moreover, it may not be the 
primary goal of a public VC company to sell its shares on the market but to 
transfer them back to the company. This is easier for mezzanine products as they 
mostly have fixed maturity (Tykvova, 2004; Bascha and Walz, 2002). The fewer 
early stage investments can be explained by their common governmental mission 
of promoting all kinds of companies and not only start-ups. On the one hand, a 
relatively low share of early stage investments in the portfolios of public VC 
firms, fewer direct equity investments and, therefore, less involvement in the 
management of the portfolio companies may lead to only low importance of 
regional proximity for their investments. On the other hand, publicly owned VC 
companies can be expected to localize their investments due to governmental 
restrictions. Consequently, the public ownership of VC companies will probably 
shape the regional focus of their investments and, hence, the importance of spatial 
distance to portfolio companies.  
 
3.  The spatial distribution of VC supply and investments in Germany 
The spatial distribution of VC suppliers and investments on VC markets can 
provide the first indications of the role of spatial proximity for investments. For 
the VC market in the USA several studies found a high degree of spatial 
clustering of suppliers and investments on the east and west coasts of the country 
(Sorensen and Stuart, 2001; Powell et al., 2002; Florida et al., 1991; Leinbach and 
Amrhein, 1987). The UK VC market is also highly clustered around London and 
the southeast part of the country, thus, playing a dominant role (Mason and 
Harrison, 1999, 2002a; Martin, 1989; Martin et al., 2005). For the ‘emerging’ VC 
                                                 
2 Mezzanine products refer to unsecured, high-yield, subordinated debt, or preferred stock that 




markets in continental Europe, such as France and Germany, Martin et al. (2002) 
also found a considerable degree of spatial concentration but this concentration 
was not as pronounced as in the case of the USA or the UK. 
The data from the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften; BVK) confirm this 
result of a relatively low degree of spatial concentration of the German VC 
market. The suppliers of this market are clustered in five regions with Munich as 
the leader having around 30 of the more than 170 regular members of the BVK in 
January 2006 and Frankfurt a. M. is in second place with 27 VC suppliers (figure 
1). However, Berlin, Hamburg, and the Rhine-Ruhr area (Duesseldorf, Cologne, 
Bonn) have around 20 VC suppliers each and several of the VC firms can also be 
found in smaller places. The black color in figure 1 indicates VC companies 
which could be clearly identified as having an underlying predominantly public 
influence, either through direct public ownership or a majority of public funding. 
Such public VC companies obviously play a considerable role in the German 
market (Sunley et al., 2005). The more obvious dispersion in space of the 
predominantly public VC suppliers is probably a result of the influence of public 
bodies on their choice of location. The spatial distribution of the German Business 
Angels Networks
3, which are indicated by flags in figure 1, is quite similar to the 
distribution of the formal private VC firms. Although, these networks only 
represent a small fraction of the informal VC investors, they give indication for 
their regional distribution.  
The spatial distribution of the total VC investments made by the members of 
the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (figure 2) also shows 
a considerable degree of regional concentration. About 60 percent of the overall 
2.5 billion € of the public and private VC investment in the years 2003, 2004 and 
2005 was made in three out of the fifteen federal states – Bavaria, Baden-
Wurttemberg, and North Rhine-Westphalia. However, only slightly more than 40 
percent of the German start-ups can be found in these states.
                                                 
3 Members of the German Business Angels Network association (Business Angels Netzwerk 
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Figure 1: The spatial distribution of VC firms in Germany (symbol size shows 
total figures)
4 
                                                 
4 Regular members of the German Private Equity Venture Capital Association and members of the 
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Figure 2: The geographical distribution of VC investments in Germany
5 
                                                 
5 Source: German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association: VC Investments in the years 









Number of private VC companies   0.97 
Number of public VC companies   0.96 
Number of banks (all types)  0.45 
Number of savings banks with specialist for start-up 
financing  0.39 
Number of R&D intensive start-ups (mean over the 
years 1990-2003)  0.45 
Number of technology intensive start-ups (mean over 
the years 1990-2003)  0.52 
Number of technology intensive start-ups (mean over 
the years 1990-2003)  0.60 
Number of patents (mean over the years 1995-2000)  0.42 
In order to assess the spatial concentration of the German VC industry, we 
calculated Gini coefficients for the regional distribution of the VC companies and 
other types of financial institutions as well as for some measures of innovative 
activity
6 (table 1). These measures of innovative activity such as the number of 
innovative start-ups or the number of patents point to locations of VC investment 
opportunities.
7 The Gini coefficients clearly show a much stronger spatial 
concentration of public and private VC companies compared to the distribution of 
banks
8. The difference is even more pronounced when comparing the value of the 
Gini coefficients for the VC companies with the value for the public savings 
banks which have at least one employee who is specialized in the financing and 
consulting of start-ups. The indicators for innovative activity also show a much 
lower degree of spatial concentration compared to the VC companies. These 
results indicate that the spatial clustering of VC firms in Germany is much more 
pronounced than the geographic concentration of the overall finance industry and 
                                                 
6 See e.g., Fritsch and Slavtchev (2005, 2006) for a more detailed analysis. 
7 Unfortunately, we cannot use the regional distribution of VC investments for this comparison 
because these data are only available on the state level and not on the level of districts. 




innovative activity. If spatial proximity should be important for the emergence 
and the maintenance of a VC partnership this higher concentration of VC firms 
could seen as an indication that there may exist an equity gap in some regions.  
Table 2:  Rank correlation coefficients for the relationship between the location of 
VC companies, banks, and potential investment targets 
  Variable:  1 2 3 4  5 6 
1  Number of start-ups (mean 
over the years 1990-2003)  1.00                
2 
Number of R&D intensive 
start-ups (mean over the 
years 1990-2003) 
0.89** 1.00             
3 
Number of technology 
intensive start-ups (mean 
over the years 1990-2003) 
0.91** 0.87** 1.00          
4 
Number of knowledge 
intensive start-ups (mean 
over the years 1990-2003) 
0.89** 0.82** 0.94** 1.00       
5  Number of banks  
(all types)  0.40** 0.50** 0.51** 0.49** 1.00    
6  Number of public VC 
companies  0.27** 0.25** 0.28** 0.29** 0.19**  1.00 
7  Number of private VC 
companies  0.35** 0.32** 0.39** 0.39** 0.26**  0.32**
Spearman and Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients. ** Statistically significant at the 1%-level. 
 
The regional distribution of VC suppliers may be shaped by two factors 
(Mason and Harrison, 1999, 173-176). First, if VC companies want to be close to 
their portfolio companies their locational choice may be strongly shaped by the 
distribution of potential investments. Second, VC companies may prefer locations 
close to other financial institutions in order to benefit from all kinds of 
agglomeration advantages such as close contact to co-investors (Martin et al., 
2005). The Gini coefficients (table 1) indicate clear differences in the spatial 
concentration between VC companies, potential investment targets, and the 
overall banking sector. Rank-correlation coefficients have been calculated (table 
2) in order to assess in how far the spatial distribution of the VC companies 




financial institutions. The results show that the regional distribution of public and 
private VC companies is linked to both the distribution of investment targets and 
financial institutions. Though, the distribution of the public VC firms is less 
dependent on the two factors. According to these coefficients, the correspondence 
of the location of VC companies and the location of banks is somewhat less 
pronounced than the relationship between the location of VC companies and 
innovative start-ups. However, the values of these coefficients, although all 
statistically significant at the one percent level, do not point to a dominant 
influence. Therefore, we still cannot say if necessity of spatial proximity to 
portfolio investments is the main reason for the location of VC companies. 
Unfortunately, the data which was used from the German Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association do not allow one to identify the location of 
investments made by a specific VC company. For a further analysis of the role of 
spatial proximity between VC firms and their portfolio companies we, therefore, 
use another database that entails a sample of this industry. This database is 
introduced in the next section. 
 
4.  Types of smart capital and investment behavior 
4.1 The database 
The empirical in depth-analysis of the role of spatial proximity for VC in 
Germany is based on an interview survey that was carried out between September 
2004 and September 2005. The survey consists of 85 personal interviews with 
managers that were actively involved in corporate financing and were specialized 
in start-up financing. All interviews were based on a largely standardized 
questionnaire. Questions pertained mainly to investment behavior, to selection of 
investments as well as to monitoring and supervision of portfolio companies. A 
special focus was on the role of spatial proximity for the selection and 
management of an investment. We interviewed one manager per firm. The firms 
from the sample were located in diverse areas of Germany. For the purpose of this 




Therefore, only 75 usable questionnaires remain for the analysis. The sample 
covers different types of financiers which offer money for innovative young 
companies. It contains 22 independent and corporate VC companies, eleven 
Business Angels, nineteen banks, fourteen VC subsidiaries of banks, and nine 
public providers of equity. The firms from the sample can be regarded as a 
representative for the respective type of financial institutions; we are, at least, not 
aware of any bias in the sample.  
In contrast to the data used in section 3, the structure of the sample has two 
main advantages. Firstly, it provides a detailed insight into the investment 
behavior of the German VC suppliers. Secondly, since the survey is not solely 
limited to financial institutions which are completely specialized in VC, it allows 
us to analyze the heterogeneity of the market for smart capital and to compare 
different types of financiers. By smart capital we mean a financial relationship 
between a provider of finance and new innovative businesses that is connected 
with pronounced reciprocal information flows between the financier and the 
financed company (Schäfer and Schilder, 2006). In addition to equity investments 
with hands-on support, the typical element of VC, smart capital also comprehends 
of credit financing offered by banks and informal VC investments by Business 
Angels. 
While there is pronounced heterogeneity between the financiers in the 
sample with regard to a number of characteristics, they all focus on nearly the 
same financial products. This is very important issue because different financial 
products may require different degrees of spatial proximity. Silent partnerships, 
mezzanine products, and credits, for example, may require considerably less 
monitoring, consulting, and regional proximity than direct equity investments due 
to lower participation in the portfolio company’s return and fewer rights of 
involvement (Bascha and Walz, 2002). 
Apart from banks, which almost exclusively use credit financing, all other 
intermediaries in our survey offer equity capital or at least products that are equity 
linked. Table 3 shows the average importance of the financial products offered 
from a range from one, i.e., the investor does not supply this product at all, to 




example, we can see that the banks focus on credit, whereas the other types of 
financiers in our sample hardly use this type of financing. Silent equity 
investments and mezzanine financing occur more frequently with the bank’s VC 
subsidiaries and public VC suppliers. Direct investments in the form of minority 
holdings are particularly preferred by VC companies and Business Angels.  
Table 3: Importance of financial products (mean values) 
   VCs  Business 
Angels  Banks Bank-VCs  public  VCs 
Credits  1.05  1.27 3.95 1.00  1.00 
Silent  partnerships  1.04  1.00 1.31 2.43  3.33 
Mezzanine 
products  1.00  1.00 1.37 1.19  1.33 
Direct investments 
up to 25%  3.00  2.28 1.00 2.29  1.67 
Direct investments 
25-50%  3.14  3.64 1.00 3.57  2.67 
1 = not used; 2 = seldom used; 3 = often used; 4 = very frequently used 
 
4.2 Number of investments and share of early stage financing 
In addition to the relatively small differences of the financial products used, there 
is an enormous degree of heterogeneity of VC suppliers and other types of 
financiers offering smart capital with regard to the structure of the companies and 
their portfolios. The average number of professional investment managers in a 
firm ranges from one for the Business Angels to 10.5 within the public VC firms. 
The average number of portfolio companies is between 3.6 investments for 
Business Angels and 417 VC investments in the average portfolio of a bank.9 
This difference becomes even more pronounced with regard to the average 
number of firms that one employee has to monitor and advise (figure 3).  
                                                 
9 All figures pertain to the department in which the interviewee worked. Since this mainly affects 




Figure 3: Average number of portfolio companies per investment manager 
The ratio of portfolio companies per investment manager is important 
because the more companies a manager has to maintain, the less time he can 
spend on each of these companies; thus, the importance of spatial proximity may 
be relatively high. For the VC companies, the bank-dependent VC firms, and the 
Business Angels, the average number of companies per manager is about four. 
The number of companies per manager is considerably higher for the public VC 
companies (more than fifteen investments per manager). The largest number of 
portfolio companies per manager, on average 100 investments, is found for the 
banks which are credit financiers. The fewer management resources per portfolio 
firm among the banks may lead to higher importance of regional proximity to the 











































VCs Business Angels Banks Bank-VCs public VCs  
Figure 4: Average share of early stage investments within a portfolio (in 
percentage) 
There are considerable differences between the types of financiers with 
regard to the share of early stage investments in their portfolio (figure 4). 
Investments in companies which are in the early stages of their technological and 
organizational development may require relatively intensive consulting and, 
therefore, spatial proximity. While this share of early stage investment amounts to 
more than 90 percent for the Business Angels in our sample and about 70 percent 
for the VC companies, it is much lower for banks
10 and for bank-dependent VCs 
(about 50 percent). The lowest share of start-up investment, less than 30 percent, 
is found for VC providers in public ownership. These figures suggest that regional 
proximity may be of less importance for the latter group.  
4.3 Spatial proximity of investors and investments 
In the interviews we asked for the average share of investments in four spatial 
categories: at the same site, not at the same site but within a distance of 100 km, 
more than 100 km away but within Germany, and investments abroad. The results 
                                                 
10 As this figure pertains only to the department in which the interviewee is working, the average 




reveal great differences between the types of providers of smart capital in our 










VCs Business Angels Banks Bank-VCs public VCs
Investment at the same site Not at the same site but within 100 km distance










VCs Business Angels Banks Bank-VCs public VCs
Investment at the same site Not at the same site but within 100 km distance
Within Germany in more than 100 km distance Abroad  
Figure 5: Average share of investments within a certain distance (in percentage) 
Banks, bank-dependent VC firms, public VC companies, and Business 
Angels all have more than 75 percent of their investment within a distance of 100 
km; thus, these portfolio firms can be easily reached. In contrast, the independent 
VC investors in our sample have less than 30 percent located within such a short 
distance but have spread their investments all over Germany and abroad. The high 
concentration of banks having investments in close proximity is, at least at first 
sight, rather astonishing because Schäfer and Schilder (2006) show that banks 
offer a lower amount of consulting than VC companies; hence, spatial proximity 
should be of relatively low importance. The high share of investments nearby can 
be explained by their tight net of regional branches which makes investments in 
distant locations unnecessary. While the high share of investment within the 
region, which we find for Business Angels, may be caused by the limited amount 
of resources they have available, the public venture capital companies are often 




5.  Can spatial proximity be substituted? 
Suppliers of VC may adopt two strategies for overcoming the problems of 
distance related with investments that are not located nearby. These approaches 
might be particularly important for independent VC companies because their 
investments are more often located farther away (see chapter 4). The first strategy 
for substituting spatial proximity is an intensive use of modern measures of 
telecommunication that may make many of the personal contacts obsolete. The 
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Figure 6: Average number of personal contacts and contacts via 
telecommunication per month 
Figure 6 shows the average frequency of contacts, personal and via 
telecommunication, between the investor and their portfolio companies per 
month. On average, the financiers meet their portfolio companies once a month. 
The highest number of meetings (1.64 personal contacts per month) is found for 
the Business Angels and the lowest number (0.43 meetings) for banks. The 
average number of contacts via telecommunication differs much more between 




phone or internet eight times a month, the banks have an average of about 1.5 
contacts. The number of telecommunications of the other types of financiers is 
between 2.3 and 4.2 contacts per month. 
The results indicate that those types of financiers which have a relatively 
large share of investments located further away, particularly the independent VC 
firms, have more contacts via telecommunication than investors with a 
pronounced regional focus. If telecommunication works as a substitute for 
personal contacts then the number of personal contacts should be relatively low 
for those companies which have frequent contact with their companies by means 
of telecommunication. We find, however, a rather similar pattern for the number 
of personal contacts and the number of telecommunications (figure 6). This result 
suggests that both ways of communication are complementary and do not 
constitute substitutes. 
Table 4:  Rank correlation coefficients for the average distance to investments and 
the number of contacts per month 
  Variable:  1  2  3 4 5  6 
1  Share of investments at 
the same site  1.00                
2 
Share of investments not 
at the same site but 
within 100 km distance 
-0.40** 1.00             
3 
Share of investments 
within Germany in more 
than 100 km distance 
-0.62** -0.04 1.00          
4  Share of investments 
abroad  -0.46** -0.17 0.22  1.00       
5  Number of personal 
contacts per month  -0.18 -0.04 0.07  0.14  1.00    
6 
Number of contacts via 
telecommunication per 
month 
-0.34** -0.06 0.26* 0.25*  0.72**  1.00 
 Spearman and Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients. ** Statistically significant at the 1%-level;  





The complementary relationship between personal contacts and 
telecommunication is confirmed by rank correlations on the micro-level of 
financiers reported in table 4. Although, the number of monthly contacts is higher 
if a large share of portfolio firms is not located on-site; the rank correlation 
coefficient of 0.72 for the relationship between the number of personal contacts 
and the number of telecommunications indicate a strong complementary 
relationship of the two modes of communication.
11 We can, therefore, conclude 
that telecommunication is not a substitute for face-to-face contacts and is not used 
as a means to overcome disadvantages of spatial distance. 
The second possibility to substitute regional proximity is the syndication of 
investments (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). In a 
syndicated investment, the lead investor conducts most of the monitoring and 
consulting. For him or her, regional proximity may be more important than for the 
co-investors who can behave more or less passively. Therefore, if an investment is 
located in a great spatial distance, syndication with a partner located close to this 
investment could help to overcome the problems of distance, at least for the co-
investor. Therefore, we expect that financiers with a high share of investments in 
spatial distance will engage more in syndication with other firms than VC 
providers which have most of their investment located on-site.  
The different types of financiers in our sample show distinct syndication 
behavior. On average, the VC companies and the Business Angels syndicate 77 
percent and 70 percent of their investments, respectively. The public VC firms 
and the banks’ subsidiaries syndicate less than two thirds of their projects. The 
lowest rate of syndication is found for the banks which have one or more co-
investors for about one third of their investments. The average total number of 
syndication partners over the whole portfolio varies even more. The VC 
companies cooperate on average with 14.5 syndication partners whereas the 
Business Angels and the banks on average only syndicate with around five 
                                                 
11 A nearly similar pattern of correlation coefficients can be found if they are calculated for each 





12 The banks’ VC subsidiaries and the public VC companies lie in 
between these values with a mean of about ten syndication partners over the 
whole portfolio. 
To find out whether the spatial focus of VC investments corresponds to the 
syndication strategy, we asked the interviewees for the location of their 
syndication partners. The possible categories were the same as for the location of 
investments (on-site, not on-site but within 100 km distance, within Germany but 
in more than 100 km distance, abroad). If syndication of investments works as a 
strategy to overcome disadvantages of spatial distance, we expect that the 
syndication partners are located close to the investment, particularly close to those 
investments that are located far away. Therefore, the share of syndication partners 
located far away should be the higher the larger the share of investments in distant 
portfolio firms.  
We find, indeed, that the regional distribution of syndication partners for the 
different types of VC providers (figure 7) is quite similar to the regional 
distribution of their investments as given in figure 5. The independent VC 
companies have on average more investment and more syndication partners in 
distant locations than the banks, the bank VC subsidiaries, the Business Angels, 
and the public equity suppliers, which on average have a higher share of 
investments and syndication partners nearby. 
                                                 
12 The number of syndication partners within a single investment varies between one and around 
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Syndication partner at the same site Not at the same site but within 100 km distance
Within Germany in more than 100 km distance Abroad  
Figure 7: Average share of syndication partner within a certain distance (in 
percentage) 
The correspondence between the share of distant investments and of 
syndication partners is confirmed by rank correlations on the micro-level of the 
financiers (table 5). The rank correlation coefficients for the relation between the 
share of investments and of syndication partners in the same spatial category are 
between 0.41 and 0.7, all statistically significant at the 1-% level.
13 This clearly 
shows that investments in distant locations make cooperation with syndication 
partners located far away more likely. This suggests that the syndication of VC 
investments is used to overcome problems of distant location of investments. 
However, our data does not show on detail whether the syndication partner are 
located close to the investments. 
 
                                                 
13 The results are quite similar if the correlation coefficients are calculated for the different types 




Table 5: Rank correlation coefficients for the relation between the share of 
investments and of syndication partners in certain spatial categories 




• at the same site  1.00 
           
2 • not at the same 
site but within 
100 km distance 
-0.41**  1.00           
3 • within Germany 
in more than  
100 km distance 
-0.63**  -0.06  1.00         





• at the same site  0.41**  -0.05  -0.34** -0.36** 1.00   
 
6 • not at the same 
site but within 
100 km distance 
0.01  0.46** -0.18  -0.17  -0.23  1.00   
7 • within Germany 
in more than 100 
km distance 
-0.28*  0.00  0.61**  0.04  -0.53** -0.16  1.00 
8 • abroad  -0.30*  -0.14  0.20  0.70**  -0.49** -0.14  0.11 
Spearman and Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients. ** Statistically significant at the 1%-
level; * statistically significant at the 5%-level. Number of observations: 75 
 
The results do not clearly show whether VC providers really mainly have 
regional proximity to an investment in mind when looking for a syndication 
partner. Therefore, we have asked the financiers to attach weights between one 
(meaning unimportant) and five (meaning dominant) to their reasons for the 
syndication of an investment and for the choice of a certain syndication partner. 
The answers to this question clearly show that the syndication partner’s spatial 
proximity to the investment is the least important of the determinants (figure 8). 
According to these figures the most important reasons for syndication are a large 




partner, and the access to the syndication partner’s network. This holds for all 
types of financial institutions offering smart capital. We can, therefore, conclude 
that spatial proximity to the location of investment plays a role for syndication 
behavior, but that it is by far not the dominating motive. 
Figure 8: What do the financiers look at when choosing a syndication partner 
In summarizing the evidence, we can say VC suppliers, especially privately 
held independent VC firms, do not entirely focus on investments nearby but have 
also firms in distant locations in their portfolio. This is particularly true in 
comparison to other providers of smart capital. Modern measures of 
telecommunication do not seem to work as a substitute for regional proximity. 
Syndication of investments may be such a substitute. However, we find that 
spatial proximity of the syndication partner to the investment is the least important 
motive for a joint investment. We, therefore, have to ask why regional proximity 
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6.  Why is regional proximity so unimportant for VC investment? 
Although we found an obvious clustering of VC companies and investments in 
Germany (section 3), our survey indicates that regional proximity between the VC 
firm and the portfolio company does in no way play a dominant role. All of our 
interview partners agreed that regional proximity is definitely an advantage for 
VC investments, mainly due to lower costs and fewer problems of monitoring and 
advising. Although, none of the interview partners neglected the importance of 
monitoring and supervision on-site of the portfolio companies; most of them 
stated that spatial proximity is not a dominant factor in this respect. With the 
exception of public VC companies, which are mostly restricted to their region, 
none of the interviewed VC managers would reject a promising investment 
opportunity that is not located at the same site, at least as a member of a syndicate. 
The reasons for this are diverse.  
First, the spatial structure of Germany is rather balanced and accessibility of 
any location within Germany is relatively easy – at least if compared to countries 
such as the UK or the US. Spatial distances are much smaller than in the US and a 
dense infrastructure for traveling exists almost everywhere. Nearly all locations in 
Germany can be reached within a day and in most cases there are convenient 
possibilities to return home on the same day. As in the study of the informal VC 
market in the UK by Mason and Harrison (2002b) many investment managers 
interviewed in our survey stated that they do not want to travel longer than two 
hours to visit a company and that many locations in Europe can be reached by a 
two hour plane trip. Furthermore, for the monitoring and consulting of companies 
that are located far away, some managers prefer staying several days on-site, 
which causes the travel times to be less important.  
Second, the majority of the interview partners stated that a limited pool of 
promising investment opportunities was a main reason for searching outside the 
region. They would invest in new companies located nearby if there were some. 
Therefore, if the mountain won't come to Mohammed, then Mohammed has to go 
to the mountain. Obviously, the main restriction for the German VC companies is 




and consulting. One of the VC managers that we interviewed wrote this on his 
questionnaire: “It is not time to pick and chose in the regional sense as long as you 
want to earn money.”
14 This indicates that the main bottleneck for occurrence of a 
VC investment in Germany is not the absence of VC suppliers but the limited 
number of promising projects.
15 As a consequence of the lack of investment 
opportunities of a sufficient quality, only about 20 billion € out of the 45 billion € 
under management by the members of the German Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association have been invested in companies as of  May 2005.
16 
 
7.  Conclusions and implications 
In this paper we have examined the role of regional proximity for VC 
investments. The main part of the empirical analysis was based on a survey of 85 
face-to-face interviews made with different types of financiers in Germany. This 
database not only enabled us to gain insight into the investment behavior of VC 
companies and their attitude towards the importance of spatial proximity to 
portfolio companies, but also we could also compare the results of the importance 
of regional proximity for different types of financiers offering smart capital. 
The analyses clearly showed that the importance of regional proximity 
between the VC firm and its portfolio companies is widely overestimated in the 
literature. The VC companies in Germany, especially the private and independent 
VC firms, do not focus mainly on investments located nearby. Although 
telecommunication and syndication of investments may be employed to overcome 
disadvantages of distance, none of these measures seemed to play a dominant role. 
The reasons that we found for the striking unimportance of geographical distance 
for German VC providers were the balanced spatial structure that leads to good 
accessibility of most locations in the country as well as a lack of promising 
investment opportunities on-site. 
                                                 
14 Translation from German questionnaire. 
15 Harding (2000) draws similar conclusions for the UK. 




One main conclusion of our analysis is that the absence of VC firms in a 
region is not likely to be a bottleneck for innovative entrepreneurs in Germany. 
We cannot confirm that there are equity gaps in certain regions that represent a 
severe problem for innovative start-ups. At least from the perspective of the VC 
managers, the main bottleneck is the presence of promising investment 
opportunities. We can, however, not completely preclude the existence of 
informational bottlenecks that prevent entrepreneurs and VC suppliers to match. 
Our results lead to some important questions for further research. First, the 
role of syndication as a possible substitute for regional proximity in the VC 
industry should be more illuminated. Second, it would be rather interesting to 
compare the performance of investments on-site with investments in considerable 
spatial distance to find out if proximity really does not play an important role. 
And third, additional research is desirable to find out if a regional equity gap or an 
information problem exists especially from the viewpoint of entrepreneurs that 
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